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1. Introduction
Abstract
What is the subjective value assigned to information?
Is the subjective value of information similar to the
realistic or normative value, or are there deviations
introduced by human processing, the framing of the
information source, or the external qualities of packaging
and ownership of the information? Do people assess
information as having the same value when offered the
chance to sell it (Willingness to Accept, WTA) as when
facing the need to buy it (Willingness to Purchase, WTP)?
This is an empirical, experimental investigation of the
effects of expertise vs. content, and copy vs. exclusive
original packaging of information on the WTA/WTP ratio.
In an animated computer simulation of a business game
players maximize their profits by making choices
regarding inventory and prices. Participants were also
offered the chance to bid in trade (buy or sell) information
regarding the weather that may affect demand. We find, as
hypothesized, that the subjective value of information
does indeed follow the predictions of Endowment Effect
theory. Participants revealed a ratio of Willingness to
Accept to Willingness to Purchase (WTA/WTP) that
resembles the ratio common in the case of private goods.
In the decisions, choices and performance recorded for the
294 subjects, we also found support for the hypothesis that
the WTA/WTP diverges from unity more often and in a
more pronounced manner for information traded in the
“original” form rather than as a copy of the original,
although even for copies the WTA/WTP ratio is still
double. Results yield a value of about three for the
WTA/WTP ratio for original information regardless of
whether the source is content or expertise. Valuations of
content and expertise did not diverge. However, the
source of information can be manipulated by system
design to become more salient. Copy information
received a subjective value which was significantly
different (lower) than original information. Implications
for both online trading and online sharing of information
are discussed.

One of the central subjects of trading in e-business is
information itself. E-business thrives on both the
availability and the exchange of information in various
forms. Every commercial transaction involves transfer of
information. Commercial transactions usually involve not
just the item being traded (books, CDs, antiques etc.) but
accompanying information as well. Information is a
unique good since use and access rights are often
transferred by copying without the transfer of exclusive
ownership rights. Similarly, expertise is transferred by
copying since it does not leave the expert’s mind. An
exception may be when an expert provides exclusive
advice and will not share or sell it again. Information and
expertise can be transferred both by sharing (advice
giving) and by trading. Since information exchange has
become an integral part of e-business, the value of
information must be part of the total transaction value
estimate.
Lack of sufficient information creates
uncertainty which in turn leads to under trading of the
goods traded. Hence, information is a catalyst to
economic activity.
So far information was discussed in the general sense
of the word. Some definitions are in order before
proceeding. Three closely-related concepts are defined:
Data, information, knowledge. Different definitions can
be found in the literature for these terms from an
information systems perspective [1, 2] or from an
economic perspective [3-5]. The definitions used here
were adopted from the knowledge management literature
[6]. While more complex and detailed definitions are
available (for example, [7]), the following definitions have
been selected because they are fairly simple and
parsimonious and enable operationalization. Data are
discrete, objective facts about events. Information is
analyzed and/or contextualized data. Information carries a
message and makes a difference as perceived by the
receiver. Knowledge or expertise is a human quality that
builds on data and information together with experience,
values, and insight. In this study we focus on two

instantiations of information: information as content and
information as expertise. Content is the more tangible of
the two.
The value of information is enigmatic. Information is
neither a private nor a public good. It is an experience
good. The main focus of this paper is to offer a way to
assess the value of information as content and expertise.
The present research proposes to investigate the
subjective value of information and expertise by
combining economic and psychological theory with
information systems research.
We use an
experimental/simulation approach to suggest possible
approaches to evaluating the intangible, subjective value
of information.

2. The Value of Information
Several unique characteristics render information
difficult to valuate. Information is an unusual good in
many aspects - production, distribution, cost, and
consumption. Information is both an end-product and an
input into the production of other goods, decisions, or
information. It often accompanies market goods as an
integral part. For example, an increasing portion of all
consumer goods are accompanied by user manuals. Our
purchasing decision may also be based on the availability
of expert advice and recommendation.
Information is expensive to produce and cheap to
reproduce [3, 4]. In fact, distribution is accomplished
mainly by reproduction or copying. The same content can
be distributed by different media, and the price is often
derived from the medium rather than from the value
delivered by the content itself. In point of fact, people
consume information both by sharing and by purchasing,
while most other goods are consumed mostly by
purchasing. The cost of information can be either direct
or indirect. The quest for the value of information is
further complicated by the fact that information is an
experience good, meaning that its value is revealed only
after consumption [4, 8].
The value of information can influence the value of
objects of commerce, therefore, we set out to investigate
the value of information and expertise as a first step of a
broader question relating to the influence of the
availability of information on trading market goods.
Theoretically, there are three ways to assess the value
of information [1, 9]: Normative, realistic, and subjective.
While user utility should be the base for calculating the
price of information, utility varies by person and
circumstance.
Realistic methods are ex post and
consequently inappropriate for evaluating information
content (also referred to as the “inspection paradox”) [8].
We
therefore focus on the subjective value of
information.
The tradition of studying decision-making under
uncertainty has addressed patterns of information use and
the value assigned to information. This literature sets the

backdrop for understanding information business trends.
The heuristics experiments [10] as well as later studies
[11] demonstrated that people tend to ignore available
information such as prior probabilities, sample size and
the like. Instead, decisions are based on other subjective
methods such as representativeness, availability, and
adjustment and anchoring (also known collectively as
heuristics). Earlier experiments have also shown that
people tend to be conservative and undervalue information
available for the revision of a prior opinion [12]. A recent
study [13] tested the pursuit of information for daily
decisions. Participants preferred to seek information and
to base their choices on (objectively) noninstrumental
information. In other words, people assigned positive
subjective value to objectively worthless information.
Theory also suggests that people seek information because
it seems the right thing to do [14], implying over-demand
for information and a high subjective value. People tend
to accumulate information “just in case” they may need it
in the future, again leading to excessive demand [8]. The
theoretical tension is, therefore, between
studies
indicating that information is under-valued and research
showing that information to be over-valued.

2.1 The Endowment Effect
Subjective value has been studied experimentally for
many types of market goods (also called private goods)
and nonmarket goods (also called public goods). One very
interesting finding of experimental research on subjective
value is the discovery of a disparity between the highest
amount one is willing to pay (WTP) for a good and the
lowest amount one is willing to accept (WTA) as
compensation for giving up the same good. This disparity
was coined as the Endowment Effect (EE) [15, 16].
Traditional economic assumptions imply that, when
income effects are eliminated, the difference between
WTP and WTA should be negligible (the difference
should amount to the decreasing marginal utility).
However, experiments with various types of goods have
shown that WTA is significantly greater than WTP. By
definition, WTA and WTP values are neither normative
nor realistic. Instead, they are subjective values, since
they represent an individual’s personal perception of an
object’s worth for him or herself. The EE methodology
itself is designed with the purpose of eliciting submissions
of private values and is described in section 3.2 below.
We apply the WTA/WTP methodology as used for various
types of goods in order to investigate the subjective value
of information with a view to determining what
characterizes information as a good.

2.2 The WTA/WTP Disparity
The consistent, unexpectedly large and uni-directional
difference between WTA and WTP observed in relation to
traditional goods and services has generated much
research interest. Attempts were made to explore whether
the discrepancy can be explained by economic theory or

whether the difference belongs to the realm of less than- or
bounded- rational choice and is rooted in psychological
origins. We will summarize some of the pertinent
literature on the WTA/WTP disparity and the explanations
offered by economists and psychologists highlighting the
common denominators of these two approaches.
Commonly, bidding is employed as the general
experimental approach for researching the values of WTA
and WTP . Participants in experiments are offered the
opportunity to bid for the purchase of an item, or to state a
reserve price for the sale of an item. There are many
bidding mechanisms and there is no specific experimental
design common to all the experiments described below. A
comprehensive methodological review detailing the types
of bids used in different papers can be found in [17].
Using the various bidding mechanisms, researchers have
demonstrated a significant disparity to exist between the
values of WTA and WTP for common market goods such
as chocolates, pens, and mugs [18, 19], and a much larger
disparity with regard to nonmarket goods such as health
[15, 20]. Trading induced-value tickets, or tokens of
known value, have not shown a WTA/WTP disparity [18,
21, 22]. Induced value tickets or tokens are characterized
by having only pure monetary value. In this case, of
“induced value” items, the expected number of trades
took place, the expected number of trades being half of all
possible trades. Herein lies one of the important
implications of the disparity, namely that the existence of a
significant difference between WTA and WTP leads to a
reluctance to trade and results in undertrading. This was
further confirmed by trading induced-value tickets of
unknown value [21, 22] as well as lottery tickets [23, 24],
which resulted in a WTA/WTP disparity and
undertrading. Interestingly, uncertainty was not the cause
for the disparity observed in the mugs experiment [18],
since the bids were made on mugs marked with clearly
visible price labels.
The studies mentioned here as well as dozens of others
[17] reveal a continuum ranging from induced (known)
value tickets, where WTA is found to equal WTP, through
market goods, where the disparity exists, and on to
nonmarket goods where the disparity is largest. The
WTA/WTP ratio approaches unity for induced value
items, being usually about 3 for market goods, while for
nonmarket goods that ratio is very large, usually about 10.

2.2.1 Theoretical Foundation of the WTA/WTP
Disparity
The main psychological explanations of the
WTA/WTP disparity are loss aversion [18, 19, 25] which
is based on Prospect Theory [26], and the degrees of
similarity and uncertainty in the cases of induced value
tokens and lottery tickets [23, 24]. The main economic
explanations are the substitution effect [20, 27], the
tradeoff between the price of information and the expected
payoff [28] and intrinsic value [29].

The Prospect Theory approach received experimental
economic substantiation [30].
Similarity observed in
psychological experiments [31] is equivalent to
economists’ explanations of the substitution effect.
Psychologists also acknowledged that lack of
commensurability is necessary for the EE to manifest itself
[18], again a hint for the substitution effect. The immunity
of induced value tickets to the Endowment Effect also
supports the substitution effect explanation as such tickets
have perfect substitutes when their values are known. The
degree of uncertainty or the amount of information
provided have also been researched both by psychologists
and by economists. The results in all cases show similar
trends. Psychological theory proposed in order to explain
the WTA/WTP disparity is based on observations of
human behavior. This is in line with economic models,
which in this area of research are inductive and based on
experimental markets rather than on traditional economic
assumptions. Overall it can be said that economic and
psychological research are moving in the same direction,
thus lending support to each other. The main underlying
causes of the EE seem to be loss aversion and the
substitution effect with their respective outgrowths.
Variables that influence the EE are the type of good traded
(induced-value, market, nonmarket) and the existence and
availability of substitutes, which imply the availability of
information on the market.

2.3 Implications for the Subjective Value of
Information
A choice to pursue information for decision making is
a result of the desire to reduce the uncertainty that
characterizes certain decisions. Information in this sense
is not a regular consumer good; it is more like a raw
material consumed in the production of other goods down
the value chain. The decisions as to what kind of
information will aid in reducing the uncertainty, where to
look for information, and what is the information worth
are in themselves made under uncertainty. One rarely
knows in advance what kind of information one will find,
what will be the quality of that information, and to what
extent will it actually reduce uncertainty. All this stems
from the fact that information is an experience good, the
value of which is revealed only after consumption and
from a lack of access to meta-information. Research that
would shed light on the value of information prior to
consumption or what influences value formation will be of
importance to information consumers, content providers,
decision makers, and information system designers.
The result of the WTA/WTP disparity, or of the EE, is
that it creates undertrading. Fewer trades take place than
should have occurred under standard economic
assumptions. As cited earlier, lack of information
contributes to an increase in the WTA/WTP divergence
and hence leads to undertrading. Conversely, abundance
of information suggests an accelerated pace of trade.
Information is an economic catalyst. Increasing its

perceived value and the demand for it should be the
objective of any market-oriented organization in wishing
to increase the number of trades. Since information is
often a crucial component of market goods, enhancing
the value of that information would enhance the overall
value of the goods and diminish undertrading.
Substitution effect theory should predict a large
WTA/WTP disparity for information. This is due to its
inherent nature as an experience good, each item of
content being unique. On the other hand, the abundance of
free information on the Internet and searchers’ inclination
to seek free content suggest a low subjective value for
information producing parity between WTA and WTP. In
light of this contradiction we have chosen to begin our
investigation with a fundamental question about the WTA
and the WTP for information in order to form a basis for
further research on factors influencing these values and
other issues of importance.
Our research questions are: Where is information
found on the WTA/WTP disparity continuum? Where is
expertise found on this continuum? What is the effect of
originality? In other words, are people sensitive to
originals versus copy in their valuation of information.
Our hypotheses are: H1: The WTA/WTP ratio for
information (content or expertise) is greater than unity and
is similar to that of private goods. H2: The WTA/WTP
ratio for content is larger than the WTA/WTP ratio for
expertise. H3: The WTA/WTP ratio for original
information (content or expertise) is larger than for copy
information. H4: There will be an interaction between the
source of information (content or expertise) and its
originality (original or copy).

3. Methodology
3.1 Research Instrument
A Java-based animated computer simulation of an
easy-to-understand business game called “The Lemonade
Stand” was used as the experimental instrument. In this
simulation the player owns a lemonade stand and must
operate it so as to maximize his/her profits by selling to
passers-by. Information about expected weather and
assumptions about its effect on demand may affect choices
regarding inventory and prices. Participants are offered
the chance to trade (buy or sell) this information, in
addition to making decisions about inventory and prices.
A detailed description of the simulation game can be
found in previous manuscripts [32-34].

3.2 Procedure
The experiment was launched by a detailed in-class
presentation of the simulation along with handouts that
consisted of the instructions and sample screenshots. A
prize was offered to the player who would achieve highest
profits. Participants were told that profits could be made
in two ways: 1. By trying to optimize the inventory,
lemonade quality, and price per cup depending on the

weather data (if available). 2. By trading information
(selling generates direct income, while buying information
can generate indirect payoffs if played wisely).
A full description of the experimental session can be
found elsewhere [32, 34, 35]. Market prices of the
information trades were built into the simulation but were
not known or revealed to the players. They were only told
that market prices were to be determined randomly and
that trades would be executed at market prices if the bids
they offered were acceptable. This was done to ensure
incentive
compatibility
according
to
the
Becker-Degroot-Marschak principle [36], known in the
literature as the BDM method. In BDM, trade takes place
only if bids are compatible with current market prices.
BDM is therefore a useful method in eliciting private
values and is a popular tool in studies of the Endowment
Effect.
Participants: Two hundred and ninety four students in
two groups of, respectively, one hundred and fifty and one
hundred and forty four participated in the experiment as
part of a class requirement. One group was presented with
information as content, the other group was presented with
information introduced as expertise. Participants were
told, variably, about the origin of the information as being
either a document or a human expert. Within each group
the order of presentation of bids changed according to a
Latin Square so that some participants received the buying
scenario first while others received the selling scenario
first. Each participant had four opportunities to bid: Buy
original, sell original, buy copy, sell copy. The
experimental design was, therefore 2X2X2: Buy vs. Sell;
Original vs. Copy and Content vs. Expertise.
The players were seated in a computer lab with an
individual computer for each player. They were not
allowed to interact with each other but were allowed to ask
the experimenter for clarifications. The experiment
yielded one value for each type of bid for the weather
information for each participant. The entire experiment
lasted an hour and a half, which included the presentation,
the warm-up games, and the four games with bidding.
A brief introduction to the game, a Powerpoint
presentation, and a link to the game itself are available at:
http://gsb.haifa.ac.il/~draban/lemonade/

4. Results
This section details the results received in the EE
experiments. These results reflect data collected from two
hundred and ninety four (294) students who provided their
private value bids for buying and selling information as
described in section 3.2. The data from the four groups of
each of the two levels of the independent variable ‘source’
(content and expertise) have been combined for the
analysis that follows. This analysis has been performed in
order to test hypotheses H1-H4 listed in Section 2.3.
Explanation of acronyms used in the tables that follow:
WTP – Willingness to pay for original weather

information
WTA – Willingness to accept payment for original weather
information
WTPC – Willingness to pay for a copy of weather
information
WTAC – Willingness to pay for a copy of weather
information
WTA/WTP – EE ratio for original information
WTAC/WTPC –EE ratio for copy information
H1: The WTA/WTP ratio for information (content or
expertise) is greater than unity and is similar to that of
private goods.
To test this hypothesis one sample t-tests were
performed to compare the mean ratios of content and
expertise with the values of one and three. Table 1
summarizes the findings of these tests for original and
copy content and expertise.
Table 1: Results for one-sample t-tests comparing the
means of the ratios for original and copy content and
expertise to values of 1 and of 3.

Orig.
Cont.
Orig.
Expt.
Copy
Cont.
Copy
Expt.

Mean
Ratio

Std.
Dev.

Test Value=1
t
Sig.

Test Value=3
t
Sig.

2.79

3.45

6.37

0.00

-0.73

0.46

2.74

3.01

6.95

0.00

-1.03

0.31

2.04

2.76

4.60

0.00

-4.27

0.00

1.85

2.27

4.53

0.00

-6.07

0.00

Table 1 clearly shows that the mean ratios for original
content and expertise are significantly different than unity.
The mean ratios for original content and expertise are not
significantly different from three while the same ratios for
copy of content or expertise are significantly different
(lower) than 3. Additional analysis revealed that the
ratios for copy content and expertise are not significantly
different from a value of two.
H2: The WTA/WTP ratio for content is larger than the
WTA/WTP ratio for expertise.
To test this hypothesis independent samples t-tests were
performed to compare the mean ratios of content and
expertise. Table 2 summarizes the findings of these tests
for original and copy content and expertise.

Table 2: Results for independent samples t-tests
comparing the means of the ratios for original and
copy content and expertise.

Original
Content
Original
Expertise
Copy
Content
Copy
Expertise

Mean
Ratio

Std.
Dev.

2.79

3.45

2.74

3.01

2.04

2.76

1.85

t

Significance

-1.33

0.89

-0.62

0.54

2.27

Table 2 shows that the mean ratios for original and copy
content and expertise do not significantly differ, meaning
that participants did not assign different values to different
sources of information.
H3: The WTA/WTP ratio for original information
(content or expertise) is larger than for copy information.
To test this hypothesis a paired samples t-test was
performed to compare the mean ratios of original content
and expertise and copy content and expertise. Table 3
summarizes the findings of the test of the independent
variable ‘originality’
Table 3: Results for a paired samples t-test comparing
the means of the ratios for original and copy content
and expertise.

Original
Content and
Expertise
Copy Content
and Expertise

Mean
Ratio

Std.
Dev.

2.77

3.24

1.95

t

Sig.

3.64

0.00

2.53

Table 3 reveals that original information is valued
significantly higher than copy information.
H4: There will be an interaction between the source of
information (content or expertise) and its originality
(original or copy).
To test this hypothesis a univariate ANOVA was
performed to compare the variances of original content
and expertise ratios and copy content and expertise ratios
and to test for interaction effects between the independent
variables, source and originality. Table 4 summarizes the
findings of the test of the independent variable
‘originality’

Table 4: Results for a univariate ANOVA comparing
the variances of the ratios for original and copy
content and expertise and the interactions between
them.
Independent Variable
F
Sig.
Originality
11.74
.00
Source
.24
.63
Originality*Source
.08
.78
Table 4 shows that while different levels of originality
bear a significant influence on private values, there is no
significant difference attributed to the source of
information. This is in agreement with findings shown in
Table 2. In addition, Table 4 shows there is no interaction
effect between the two independent variables, originality
and source. Originality is significant regardless of the
source. The value attributed to a specific source does not
change with different levels of originality.

3. Discussion
Based on performance in a simulated business
management task we have found, as hypothesized, that the
subjective value of information does indeed follow the
predictions of Endowment Effect theory. Participants
revealed a ratio of Willingness to Accept to Willingness to
Purchase (WTA/WTP) that resembles the ratio common in
the case of private goods. It should be emphasized that this
ratio should (analytically) approach unity. However, the
empirically revealed preference here places this ratio
elsewhere. Of the 294 subjects, we also found support for
the hypothesis that the WTA/WTP diverges from unity
more often and in a more pronounced manner for
information traded in the “original” form rather than as a
copy of the original, although even for copies the
WTA/WTP ratio is still double. In other words, the
realization that information is owned exclusively
attenuates the Endowment Effect.
Another way to examine the same result is to state that
exclusive access to information, that is enforceable by
information systems (such as information security,
encoding, etc.) might strengthen the endowment effect on
subjective valuation of information.
The high variance of the ratios for copy information
occurred in part as a result of a large number of people
submitting bids which resulted in ratios smaller than one.
This is an interesting observation because it means that
participants realized that they could make a quick profit
from selling information which they could later still use
for themselves. This indicates a very good understanding
of the game rules. Further statistical analysis of the initial
data confirmed our findings. When comparing the ratio
components, WTA for expertise with WTA for content, as
well as WTP for expertise and for content no significant
differences are observed although values for expertise
were always higher than for content. WTAC for expertise

and content have been found to have a statistically
significant difference (t=2.68; p<.01) and so have WTPC
for expertise and content (t=2.38; p<.02). This confirms
the previous finding relating to the higher value assigned
to original than to copy information.
The trend toward higher value for expertise without
statistical significance raises some thoughts. It shows the
flattening effect of the computer where the typical
e-business decision maker has to imagine an expert or a
document based on text displayed on a screen. In addition,
the large bidding scale in this experimental setup induced
variance. Participants could place bids between 0 and 100
dollars for either buying or selling. The scale is even
larger considering that decimals were allowed. Research
in social science usually involves using a smaller scale
such as seven-point Likert scales. The scale was not
defined by any anchors which provide meaning to specific
choices. Again, scales used in social sciences often have
anchors such as “agree” and “disagree”. In our scale there
was no ‘right’ or ‘correct’ answer. Our scale in effect is a
one item measure, in contrast to psychological measures
where several items are used to quantify specific traits or
constructs.
The high variance is in accord with the high uncertainty
associated with buying and selling experience goods. The
value of experience goods is not known a priori and there
is no indication for it. Perhaps smaller variance will be
achieved if a ‘preview’ is made available for the weather
forecast in our game. Examples of ‘previews’ for other
information experience goods include abstracts of articles
and film previews.
If we look at the same issue from a different angle, in
electronic commerce bidding is always a one item measure.
This characteristic can be manipulated. For example, a
wide scale without anchors may induce higher bids which
are in the interest of auction sites.
The value assigned to specific information by a certain
person can vary according to external circumstances. This
implies that subjective value is inherently unstable. Social
science usually aims to identify stable or generalizable
phenomena. Here instability is inherent. External
circumstances include parameters such as timeliness, form,
and content[9]. These parameters change per person and
between people and are perceived differently especially
when there is uncertainty about information.
While the first and third hypotheses were held up by
our data, we found no support for the hypothesis regarding
differences in valuation due to the source of information.
Attributing the information to expertise or to a document
had no significant impact on the WTA/WTP ratio. In other
words, the subjective value of information is not variously
affected in these results by the nature of the information.
This result is surprising as we intuitively assumed a
difference and because previous research has identified a
difference [37]. The difference originally reported in the
literature was attributed to ownership. Expertise was
perceived to be privately owned rather than owned by the

organization. Information as product, a computer program,
was perceived to be more organizationally owned.
Sharing an organizationally owned information product
was found to be mediated by prosocial transformation,
people weighed the social good more than their personal
benefits. In other words, according to this research when
it comes to tacit knowledge, personal ownership supported
sharing more than organizational ownership. This finding
runs contrary to the general consensus in the knowledge
management literature, which stresses the main difficulty
as sharing tacit knowledge [6]. Thus, the findings of the
present study align better with the knowledge
management literature than with our specific hypothesis
H2. In a later study [38] a product, a computer program,
was perceived to be organizationally-owned and led to less
sharing than privately-owned expertise. Both studies cited
here were concerned with sharing information while the
present focus is on trading information. It seems that
people may behave differently when sharing information
than when they are faced with the choices of buying and
selling information.
To summarize, when trading information, as opposed to
sharing it, people are sensitive to originality but not to the
source. When access to some information is limited to a
privileged few sets of eyeballs, that information is
accorded or assigned a high value. When the information,
content or expertise, becomes commonplace, its value
decreases. Is it possible that the well-known economic
concept of 'scarcity' governs our trading behavior as it
does for other market goods? Is scarce information valued
higher than widely-available information? This would
mean that either behaviorally or cognitively people have
not yet absorbed the concept of 'network economy', that
information is distributed mostly by copying and its value
does not necessarily decrease because of that. On the
contrary, in a network economy value sometimes increases
with wider distribution. The value of software is one such
example – end-user software is often more valuable as
more people use it and become dependent on it for
communicating with other users.
Although our findings do not support the distinction
between content and expertise and the ownership status
implied by these forms of information cited in previous
studies, we did find an ownership effect that resonates
with the studies on information sharing and studies on EE
in other market goods. First, an EE was observed and was
statistically significant. EE is attributed to ownership
status in the literature [18, 39]. Secondly, the fact that
originality played a significant effect in the results shows
that ownership matters. If everyone has access then value
does drop, but if only one person has exclusive
access/ownership value increases. Of course, ownership
itself and perceptions of it can be affected and
manipulated via system design.
A possible explanation for the surprising lack of
significance of the source variable may perhaps be
explained by the experimental manipulation. Both sources
were explained to the participants textually on screen.

This uniformity of presentation provided experimental
control. However, it may be argued that a computer can be
used to present different forms of information differently.
Perhaps our 'bare bones' controlled design created a
flattening effect where any kind of information looks and
feels the same. Graphics, sounds, and more elaborate texts
could have contributed to stronger differentiation between
both forms of information. This would be difficult to
operationalize while keeping experimental control.
Another way to examine perceptions of types of
information is to experiment with stronger contrasts.
Information in our experiment was important for
estimating market demand for lemonade but perhaps it
was not perceived as critical information. Experimenting
with more critical information may elicit a difference
between sources. For example, if a life-or-death situation
is described as expertise, say a doctor's advice, it would be
valued more than content, say an article taken from an
encyclopedia. Another topic which is not a life-death
question but could carry strong implications is investment
information. Is analyst advice valued more than an
information flier distributed by a bank? Another example
may be related to professional decisions. Would we value
an article we read in a work situation more than seeking an
expert's advice? It would be interesting to see if a larger
gap between EE ratios is revealed with further research,
running the simulation game varying the criticality of the
information. Of course the most obvious path for further
research is to expand work on sharing information. What
are the equivalent dimensions to WTA/WTP when sharing
rather than trading is at stake?
Our research shows a value of about three for the
WTA/WTP ratio for original information regardless of
whether the source is content or expertise. The similarity
between content and expertise may be attributed to some
extent to the trading scenario and to some extent to the
flattening effect of our simulation. However, some of our
results indicate that source may become significant
depending on the degree of criticality, or, in other words,
source can be manipulated by system design to become
more salient. Copy information received a subjective
value which was significantly different (lower) than
original information. This observation invites further
research into information system users’ perceptions of the
information economy. Information systems can be used to
enhance understanding of network economy and they can
be used to manipulate prevailing perceptions. Finally,
since the ‘source’ variable did not display statistical
significance, it came as no surprise that no interaction with
the ‘originality’ variable was observed. In summary,
studying the subjective value of information by using a
computerized simulation of a simple business game as an
experimental setting where EE methodology was applied
proved to be a very productive research line which should
be further elaborated by future work. The nature of
information which is transferred by sharing, not just by
trading, also invites research which would use a similar
platform to assess the interplay or interdependence
between trading and sharing content and expertise.
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